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In 1998 Rüdiger Dornbusch gave the Munich Lectures in Economics entitled
“International Financial Crises”. The CES Academic Council awarded him the
prize and title “Distinguished CES Fellow” for his outstanding work on the
monetary theory of  foreign trade.
Rüdiger Dornbusch passed away on July 25, 2002, before he was able to finalize
the manuscript of his most stimulating and thought-provoking lectures. The
manuscript was scheduled to appear in the CESifo book series with MIT Press.
This working paper contains the introduction which was distributed at the
lectures. CES would like to make this document available to the scientific
community. 
There is a video presentation of the lectures on the CES website
(www.CESifo.de), and a leaflet is also available with the introductory speech by
Stanley Fisher. 
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In the aftermath of every crisis, whether war or currency collapses, there is a soul-searching
effort to build a better world. Just such an effort, short lived and without leaving a trace, got
underway after the Mexican debacle. Another one, more substantial because of Japan’s role in
it and the extent of Asia’s disaster, is being conducted just now. This is a great occasion for
bad ideas, or just impractical ones, to gain currency. Just in case, let us set out here where the
crises come from and what is the most effective way of dealing with them.
In the past, balance of payments crises were predominantly current account crises and the
story would go somewhat like this. A country had a large trade deficit from overvaluation or
over-expansion or from both. There was some debt service and there was not enough money
around. Reserves would already have run off, new loans were not to be gotten. Sooner or later
a devaluation and/or recession would rectify the situation and, for habitual offenders, they
would soon be back in the same situation. More often than not, the external deficit was just
the counterpart of a budget deficit, happy twins of overspending supplemented with fixed
rates to contain inflation and thus give the public a boon, too, by rising real wages in dollars.
Social peace means high wages in dollars, big government and full employment, while
external balance means just that you can pay your way. Obviously the two goals can come in
conflict and reality, meaning the external constraint, always wins out, sooner or later. When it
comes to the showdown, spending needs to be cut and wages in dollars have to fall; austerity
is the answer.
More recent crises, starting with the early 1990s in Latin America, Mexico in 1994-95 and
now Asia and Russia are fundamentally different in that balance sheet issues are entirely
central to the fact and surely the propagation of the crisis. These crises have to do with an
inability to roll an existing debt, a liquidation scramble and a resulting currency collapse.
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Balance sheet crises by their nature have far more leverage both in collapsing a country’s
financial structure and hence its economy but also in spreading contamination. They are
                                                
1 The term liquidation scramble comes from the 1930s where it was used in the context of the liquidity of the
national balance sheet at a time of financial crisis.capital market crises. If capital market crises have more oomph once they happen; meltdown
is the best description. Their resolution is also more complicated and certainly more costly. 
Designing an international system that is less crisis-prone must address the central issue of
capital market crises ─ unsound finance, which translates into national balance sheet
vulnerability. Vulnerability is the key word; risk is another way of looking at it. No two crises
are quite alike but they all have in common that without significant vulnerability, currency
and financial collapse is very unlikely.
Interpreting the Asian Crisis: 
The Asian crisis is easily interpreted as a capital market crisis – not a crisis of capitalism, as
the Japanese officials like to argue. Central to that interpretation, several ingredients:
•  In the balance sheets of the financial system and large corporations there is systematic
mismatching of maturities. They borrowed short either because it is cheaper or because
nobody is willing to lend to them at long maturities. On the asset side they are funding
with these loans long-term investments such as real estate development, corporate capital
formation or even infrastructure. Not a good idea to fund highways with overnight money.
In referring to loans we already make implicitly the point that equity might have been a
much better vehicle. The resulting vulnerability takes the form of liquidity risk – the
sudden inability to roll over debts.
•  The second source of vulnerability was mismatching of denominations. Asia borrowed in
dollars or yen to fund investments with payoffs in local currency. As a result, balance
sheets were exposed to the risk of currency movements. A major currency depreciation
would carry the risk of bankrupting a large part of the financial system or their loan
customers.
•  The third source of vulnerability was market risk – borrowing to carry assets that are
exposed to large fluctuations in their capital value: stocks, commodities, foreign exchange
or high risk instruments such as Brady bonds. Korean financial institutions, for example,
had taken a large position in Russian bonds and Brazilian Brady bonds. When their prices
fell sharply the balance sheets of the Koreans had instantly a huge hole.
•  The next source of vulnerability is national credit risk. Because the various banks and
companies had collectively assumed a large risk position, the national credit rating hadbeen put at risk with spillover effects to anyone in case of a liquidation scramble both in
terms of the capital value of their assets and the access to alternative sources of credit. 
In a well supervised financial system – say the US or the UK today – all this could not have
happened. But, of course, it is routine in Japan, Russia or anywhere in Latin America. The
negligent or deliberate lack of regulation, supervision and transparency then comes in as an
explanation for the fragile financial structure. This is further complicated by a key mistake on
the part of central banks: gambling away the reserves. Central banks in both Thailand and
Korea went out of their way to take gambles in forward markets until their reserves were
gone; they went out of their way to cheat on the numbers. Any sense of sleaze or lack of
transparency was certainly reinforced by the active cooperation of bureaucrats who have
worked untiringly, taking bribes, overlooking flagrant risk taking and adding to the
vulnerability by misrepresenting central bank assets. All this would not be possible without
active help from politicians. In this last sense, the Asian crisis is also a crisis of sleazy
governments.
Of course, vulnerability alone is not enough to have an accident. Something has to happen to
bring the fragility into play. Here external factors play a role. It would be wrong to place the
entire blame on mismanagement in the Asian economies themselves. Two critical
complications came from the outside. But that is by way of explanation – vulnerability has to
do with just such possibilities! First, Japan went tanked and the resulting deterioration in
Asian economies’ trade environment accounts for some of the problem and the shadow
following over Asian investment opportunities for more. Second, and perhaps more
important, movements in the dollar/yen rate moved sharply, thereby leaving the dollar
peggers high and dry. That, too, is only by way of explanation. As the Figure shows, the yen
had been as low as 80 yen/$ only a few years ago and not the 200 in the mid-1980s. The idea
that the yen could depreciate was not a brand new concept that risktakers could be excused for
not ever having imagined. Those who enjoyed the stark yen overvaluation with its resulting
export competitiveness for dollar peggers surely must have understood that the pendulum
swings wide both ways. The summary of factors can be customized to country experiences. What makes the
Philippines special? They came late to the game, took little of the external money and hence
had less of a balance sheet problem and less of a meltdown – more nearly the old style of
crisis. Or Malaysia, banking problems yes but much less of an external debt problem because
financing took the form of direct investment. Or Korea, where the aggravation of
circumstances lies in the dysfunctional corporate structure – debt equity ratios of 500 percent
plus for the chaebols which control 50 percent of GDP. 
If so much is made of vulnerability now, how come nothing had gone wrong in the past? The
answer is that the vulnerability was of very recent vintage – 3 or 4 years and not more.
Financial opening and hence the very possibility of taking on big risks rather than just bad
loans on balance sheets is a matter of the past handful of years, and it takes a while to take on
too much and meet a challenge.
The typical scenario, following financial liberalization, is a lending boom funded by offshore
borrowing under the cover of a fixed or at least very stable exchange rate. Then, once










86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98overdone, goes sour, and soon there is a conflict between keeping up the financing by high
interest rates or the domestic institutions, banks and companies by low interest rates. If the
interest rates are cut, the currency crashes, and if they are raised, the banks and companies
crash. In the end –  that is the experience –  both crash because individual foreign lenders
understand that the situation is not viable, returns don’t cover the risk and  the herd is leaving,
and they certainly don’t want to be left holding an empty bag.
Vulnerability is in part an objective fact but, just as in the case of bank runs, in part it is in the
eyes of the beholder. Contamination therefore is very much part of the play. If the
unsustainability of banks or debts is obvious in one place, hard questions will immediately be
asked of the next – why not earlier is an interesting question but not relevant at this point.
Safety first is the motto of investors when they smell a rat. Thus one vulnerable economy
after another tumbles. They did not have to in some immutable statistical sense; it was just
that they came under suspicion and the rest is history. Countries that are not vulnerable will
also be tested, but they can raise rates and defend their currency, and that quickly becomes a
losing game for investors so that they call off the siege, at least until further notice. 
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Note that neither current account deficits nor budget deficits nor even misaligned exchange
rates were part of the balance sheet crisis rendition. In fact, the budget situation in most Asian
economies was quite strong, and while exchange rates collapsed, they certainly had not been
crassly overvalued as measured by PPP comparisons. (At least that was the case in Asia,
though not, of course, in Mexico.) If there was a sign of something amiss, it was in the boom
atmosphere that had gotten to construction, consumption and luxury imports. It had all the
experience of what in the late 1970s Argentines called plata dulce.
Good Answers: 
The right answer to crisis avoidance is controlling risk. That is done routinely in the domestic
financial system of the UK or the US, where the supervisory authorities set and enforce
capital standards as well as sophisticated risk measurement. The London authorities go further
in imposing differentiated capital requirements for cross-border loans to regions where
regulatory or supervisory standards are classified as lax. That is being serious about risk. 
                                                
2 What is said here of Asia is not the case, however, of Russia or Brazil where budgets are unabashedly large.How could this be done at the international level? A modest ambition is to create a new
culture that focuses on a dissemination of the right thinking. A more ambitious scheme makes
support in case of “honest” accidents conditional on compliance with a tightly written and
audited scheme.
The starting point of any discussion is that regulatory authorities and supervisors in most
countries even today have no clue, nor for that purpose do rating agencies. The appropriate
conceptual framework is value at risk, a model-driven estimate of the maximum risk that can
be encountered for a particular balance sheet situation over a specified horizon with a stated
probability. There are genuine issues of modeling, but there is no issue whatsoever in
recognizing that this approach is the right one. Measures such as debt to exports never appear
in it, but the ratio of foreign liabilities as a share of total liabilities or the share that is short-
dated would just as much as the variability (or probability of an adverse in an event scenario)
of asset prices. 
If authorities everywhere enforced a culture of risk-oriented evaluation of balance sheets,
extreme situations such as those of Asia would just disappear or, at the worst, become a rare
species. Perhaps it took a bad experience to understand that the issue is risk, and it is latent in
a balance sheet rather than falling from heaven.
The more ambitious step, with an appropriate transition period, is to actually use the regular
IMF consultations as the inspection opportunity for the national balance sheet. Countries that
would want to have IMF support when in trouble would only qualify if they have, in fact, in
the recent past been in compliance with an agreed risk control strategy. This procedure has
three advantages. First and foremost, it institutionalizes risk analysis as part of the local
supervisory process and as such creates the right culture. Second, it directly lowers risk levels
worldwide because countries will be eager to qualify for IMF support in case of honest
accidents, which are still possible though less likely. Third, anyone who opts out and wants to
run a national gambling house can do so. But it is clear to financial markets that value at risk
exceeds internationally acceptable thresholds and, as a result, financing will be hard to get and
will be expensive; hence the incentive for rogue countries to join the club.
There is nothing wild-eyed about this proposal, particularly if there is a transition period in
which countries can implement what each and every one of them should want to do with the
greatest urgency. But that does not mean it will happen at the IMF. The IMF is owned and
operated by its board, i.e. representatives of countries like Japan who have no concept ofsound finance and no willingness to get there soon. The IMF and its board actively enjoys
crisis situations, they give the opportunity to wield power, discipline and to grandstand. The
notion that anything preemptive is impractical is just far too easily accepted. Accordingly, the
immediate interest of what to do with a Russia commands the only attention and how to get a
less risky system some 4 or 5 years from now gets none.
Denouncing Some Bad Answers 
Among the bad ideas we should single out some as particularly inadequate. If Goldman goes
public to get more firepower, should not the international financial system also get more
ammunition? The first is, of course, to provide more money. True, the world financial system
today has far more firing power than ever before. Investors have deep pockets and countries
cannot be expected to have the resources that can conceivably match what 100 short sellers
(including central banks who join the attack, as indeed happens) can put on the table. Making
available more rescue money, without anything else, is much the same as better arms for the
police – it raises the quality of the shootouts. 
It is already the case that the resources used since Mexico exceeds anything one might have
imagined at the beginning of the 1990s when the last debt default was still being worked off.
How much more and with what success? As we come to the hard core “too large to fail
countries” Russia and Brazil – flagrant offenders both in fiscal probity and risk management –
the numbers become staggering and the violence done in terns of moral hazard unbounded.
On the contrary, would it not be a good idea to have a country like Russia do a forced
restructuring of maturities to make the point that what seems totally liquid to the lender in fact
never is in a crunch. That ought to help mismatching of maturities.
Another terrible idea is capital controls as an alternative to risk management. One might have
sympathy with Chilean-style management of inflows, but one has to doubt that countries
where inefficient or dishonest administration is the rule (unlike in sweet Chile!) can run a
sensible system. More likely it will be a festival of corruption.
An even worse idea, or a non-idea, is an Asian IMF. In the heat of the Thailand crisis,
possibly as a very cynical move to push the US Treasury and the IMF into lending and avoid
a key contributing role for itself, Japan offered the idea of an Asian IMF and has kept that
idea alive to this day. The Asian IMF would pool resources and engage in mutual surveillance
in the region. Who can take this seriously? The lead country, Japan, is the most in need of aserious financial clean up and the least able to exercise leadership since it is totally stymied by
its own problems. Who can see a Korean official telling an Indonesian that they need to pull
their socks up and can’t be quite so corrupt? If it had gone anywhere, it would have been a
festival about restrictions and circumvention and priorities for Japanese banks to get paid off
ahead of the rest. Fortunately and rightly, China stayed away from the whole exercise and it
became a flop.
IMF Programs 
Another area of contention is what exactly the IMF should ask of countries on the operating
table. In the course of the Asian crises the IMF got a bad name, just as they already had in
Latin America in the 1970s. In fact, at the time the IMF had been demonized and it is a bit
surprising how it recovered its reputation or at least lost the stigma. Perhaps it was the success
of Mexico with ultra-IMF policies.
Many, but most surprisingly, World Bank chief economist Joe Stiglitz has been preaching
liberation theology. His message is simply this: the IMF is wrong, high interest rates in the
process of stabilization are destructive of sound credit and fiscal restraint is inappropriate
since it adds to the recessionary forces. It is not quite clear what the stabilization is all about if
it is not tighter money and sounder public finances.
A key point is to separate debt restructuring, which is unpopular but may be inevitable, from
high interest rates. To restore financial stability the first point is to put a floor under the
currency. If everybody wants to get out because the risk-reward trade-off is too unfavorable,
high interest rates are the way to change the equation. A successful stabilization without a
hike in rates is like the Chicago Bulls with Michael Jordan – hard to imagine. But that may
well leave the issue of bad debts in banks and companies and, as a result, bankruptcy risks.
The answer is twofold. First, you can’t make omelets without breaking some eggs. Second,
debt write-offs may be inevitable; not raising rates is just a bad idea, not a solution.
Mexico, for example, fully implemented a stark US-IMF program of tight money to stabilize
the currency and restore confidence. It implemented a tight fiscal policy to restore public
credit. Starting off in a near-meltdown situation, confidence returned and within a year the
country was in the second leg of a V-shaped recovery. The high interest-rate policy was far
from easy, economically and politically, and partial debt relief was provided, at public
expense, to various sectors. That pragmatic way of dealing with the high interest-rate issueought to be the example of separating debt issue (dead money) from the problem of reversing
capital flight and stabilizing exchange rates. The IMF is unqualifiedly right in its insistence on
high rates as the front end of stabilization. 
The fiscal issue is in principle more complicated. If a country runs into a currency crisis but
actually has no fiscal or debt problem to speak of, why should the budget be tightened? The
answer is surely  no, there is no reason to take extra pain. Of course, in practice that is not the
case. In Asia, financial distress of banks and companies moved a very substantial liability into
the budget. As a result there was a major prospective fiscal deterioration and a resulting need
to make provision. Taking a 30 percent of GDO hit in public credit needs an offset in the
budget to restore confidence of investors. In fact, the less is done on the budget the more will
have to be done in interest rates. While in some cases the IMF may have been overzealous, it
is doubtful that much of a mistake was made. Public finance has deteriorated massively;
calling back mega projects at such a time is totally correct. 
It must be very  confusing to finance ministers and central bakers around the world to see the
World Bank shoot them in the back. Liberation theology is a very bad idea, which makes
everybody’s task of stabilization even harder than it already is. If somewhere in the
Washington institutions there is malpractice, it surely is at the World Bank.CESifo Working Paper Series
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